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This Development Viewpoint draws on Rizzo 2013 to anal-
yse how informal transport workers in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania’s 
largest city, succeeded over time in building a workers’ organ-
isation that made progress in establishing employment rights 
for its members.
It is widely believed that organising efforts for employment 
rights among informal workers are not likely to be successful. 
The main reason given is that informal employment relation-
ships do not embody a direct employer–employee relationship. 
But the relative success of Tanzania’s transport workers demon-
strates that progress can be made. And their protracted strug-
gles highlight some important general lessons.
The Context for Struggle
Dar es Salaam is a city with an estimated three million residents. 
Its bus transport system relies on about 10,000 privately owned 
minibuses, also known as daladala, to provide the cheapest 
means of mass public transport. 
In the operations of daladala there is a clear division between a 
small class of bus owners and a large class of transport workers 
estimated to be between 20,000 and 30,000. The great majority 
of these workers are casual workers operating buses that they 
do not own. And the oversupply of such workers hampers their 
bargaining power. 
How they are paid by their employers also transfers most of the 
operating risks onto the workforce. Workers have to pay a daily 
non-negotiable rent to the owners to operate their buses, and 
they earn their meager income only after subtracting all opera-
tional expenses. 
Therefore, at the beginning of each working day, the profit for 
bus owners is known while the incomes of the workforce, if any, 
are uncertain. Moreover, workers face harsh working conditions. 
Their average working day stretches to 15 hours and their work-
ing week to 6.5 days. Their occupations are also insecure since 
the average tenure on any given bus is less than eight months. 
Sources of Worker Power 
All along, the daladala workers have possessed potential ‘struc-
tural power’ since the buses that they operate constitute the 
cheapest (though still barely affordable) means of motorised 
public transport. But for years they had lacked any ‘associational 
power’ to advance their common interests. 
This status began to change in 1997 when a handful of bus driv-
ers and conductors banded together to form their own informal 
workers’ association called UWAMADAR. In Swahili this acronym 
stands for ‘Umoja Wa Madereva na Makondakta Wa Mabasi ya 
Abiria (Daladala) Mkoa wa Dar es Salaam’. 
From the outset, the association’s main goal was the regulation 
of the insecure employment relationship in the sector. Once 
formed, the association sought out the help of COTWUT, the 
Tanzania Communication and Transport Workers Union.
Though initial relations between the two organisations were 
not easy, COTWUT eventually helped the daladala workers to 
formally establish their association. By April 2000, UWAMADAR 
was officially registered as an autonomous workers’ association 
as well as a branch of COTWUT. 
After gaining legal status and securing some resources to orga-
nise, UWAMADAR turned its attention to recruiting members—
seemingly a very daunting task. Initially it focused on identify-
ing its potential leaders at individual stations or along certain 
bus routes, and educating them about its broad mission and 
concrete goals.  Despite many difficulties, by 2003 this workers’ 
association boasted over 5,200 members.
A Typical Bus Stop in Dar es Salaam 
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Securing a Contract
The Coalition of UWAMADAR and COTWUT pushed for collec-
tive bargaining in order to achieve their demands at the same 
time that they supported wildcat strikes and localised walk-
outs of workers. This two-pronged strategy was based partly 
on recognising that there was a large oversupply of unskilled 
workers in the transport sector eager to take the jobs of any 
striking union workers. 
Hence, these workers also relied on getting the government 
involved to deal directly with DARCOBOA, the Tanzania asso-
ciation of bus owners/employers. Faced with widespread work-
ers’ unrest that threatened to disrupt the city’s transportation, 
the government put pressure on DARCOBOA to negotiate an 
agreement with the transport workers.
After extended negotiations, especially on the issue of con-
tracts, a collective agreement between the two sides became 
legally binding in March 2004. This agreement spelled out the 
employee-employer relationship in the sector, including the 
wage level, the official daily working hours and even the work-
ers’ entitlement to holidays. 
Enforcement Problems
Despite the victory of securing a labour contract, there were 
ensuing problems with its enforcement. One drawback was the 
contract’s employer-inspired specification of necessary skills for 
drivers and conductors, which many of the relatively uneducat-
ed workers did not possess.
Also, the extremely rapid turnover of workers in the sector 
tended to weaken the workers’ organisation. Moreover, while 
the government supported the collective-bargaining process, 
it exerted little effort to ensure its enforcement. The workers’ 
Coalition responded by pushing for a stronger intermediary 
role for the government.  
For example, it lobbied for the government’s newly-established 
Sea and Maritime Transport Regulating Authority to compel the 
bus owners to provide evidence of individual workers’ contracts 
before issuing them with a passenger transport license. Finally, 
in 2009, after strenuous efforts by the Coalition, the govern-
ment adopted this recommendation. 
The Main Lessons
What are the most important lessons that can be learned from 
the struggles of Tanzania’s bus transport workers? Since the 
events analysed in this paper are context-specific, they cannot 
be specifically replicated. 
But a number of general lessons can be derived about the ac-
tors involved (namely, African workers in the informal economy 
who partner with a trade union), as well as about the goals that 
workers’ political mobilisation can hope to achieve in increas-
ingly liberalised and informalised economies.
The first lesson from the Tanzanian struggle is about process: 
realising ‘associational power’ can entail a slow effort at con-
structing a common ground between informal workers and 
their union counterpart. The leadership of informal workers was 
key to the success of their political organisation. At the same 
time—and contrary again to widespread skepticism—trade 
unions can make a positive contribution to this effort.  
Second, it is important to take a political economy approach 
when analysing workers’ organisation in the informal economy. 
Making sense of why and how workers mobilise politically must 
start from locating them within their economic contexts, identi-
fying their specific links to employers and mapping the sources 
of both their precariousness and their power. 
For example, a key strength on which bus transport workers in 
Dar es Salaam drew was their capacity to critically affect mass 
transportation in Tanzania’s capital through threats of strikes 
and other forms of protest. 
The third general lesson is that there are problems with the 
widely held belief that collective action by organised (or organ-
ising) informal workers for their rights at work belongs only to 
the past. 
Transport workers in Dar es Salaam did lack a clear employment 
relationship to their employers—the main characteristic that 
is alleged to prevent workers from effective mobilising in the 
informal economy. Yet the struggle of these workers achieved 
significant step towards formalising their employment relation-
ship with the bus owners. 
It is thus important in each instance to concretely identify ‘the 
realm of the possible’ for each group of workers in a particu-
lar economic sector and country. But, above all, it is critical to 
place the character of ongoing labour struggles at the centre 
of reflections on the potential for effective political action by 
precarious workers.
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